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"Floating" Choice-of-Law
Clauses and Their Enforceability
1. Background
Choice-of-law clauses in international agreements generally rely for
their enforceability on the principle of party autonomy. In a standard
choice-of-law clause parties provide for a single legal system to govern
their contract. Choice-of-law clauses in loan agreements between Mexican
borrowers and U.S. lenders, however, often provide that loan agreements
shall be governed by the laws of a specified U.S. jurisdiction unless the
lender brings a suit in a Mexican court, in which event they shall be
governed by Mexican law. I Because the question of the enforceability of
choice-of-law clauses of this type has never been addressed by the United
States courts, some U.S. lawyers express doubts as to the legal effect of
these provisions.
As a general rule, party autonomy with regard to the choice-of-law
governing contracts is recognized in U.S. jurisprudence. This autonomy
is subject to two major limitations: (1) the chosen law must bear some
relationship to the parties or to the transaction; (2) the chosen law must
not offend any of the fundamental policies of the forum or of the state
which would otherwise be applicable. 2 In the case of Mexican contracts
there can be no doubt that both the law of Mexico and the law of the
U.S. jurisdiction chosen by the parties are significantly related to the
parties and to the transaction. It appears also that no question of fun-
damental public policy would be involved. Consequently, there should be
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I. Provisions of this kind are usually inserted into the contracts on the insistence of
Mexican counsels of United States lenders. According to Mexican lawyers, such provisions
significantly facilitate potential future litigation in Mexico.
2. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAW § 187; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 105 (1977).
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no legal impediment to the enforcement by a U.S. court of the choice-
of-law provisions used in loan agreements with Mexican borrowers.
II. The Armar
The issue of the validity of a choice-of-law clause similar to that used
in loan agreements with Mexican borrowers has been recently analyzed
in a series of English decisions starting with the case of Armar Shipping
Co., Ltd. v. Caisse Algerienne d'Assurance et Reassurance.3 In this case
the plaintiffs, Cypriot ship owners, had chartered a vessel to a Cuban
company. The charter party provided for arbitration in London, and the
general average would be settled and adjusted in London according to
York-Antwerp Rules, 1950. 4
Under the charter party, a cargo of sugar was shipped from Cuba to
Spain and Algeria. The bills of lading did not incorporate the charter party
terms. During the voyage, the vessel grounded off the coast of Spain.
Before the cargo destined for Algeria was delivered, a Lloyd average bond
was signed by the master of the vessel on behalf of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs brought action against the cargo owners for contribution
alleging that they had incurred sacrifices and expenditures of general
average. Clause 10 of the bills of lading provided that:
general average shall be adjusted, stated and settled according to York-Antwerp
Rules 1950, except the rule XXII thereof, at such port or place as may be
selected by the carrier. Matters not provided for by these rules to be adjusted,
stated and settled according to the laws and usages at such port or place as
may be selected by the carrier.
Similarly to the choice-of-law clause used in loan agreements with Mex-
ican borrowers, the governing law in Armar depended upon the choice
of the forum by one of the parties. The English court refused to give
effect to this clause. According to the court, the governing law of the
bond was "floating" and became "fixed" only at the moment the place
of adjustment had been selected:
If ... at the time when the contract was made, the question remained un-
decided whether the average adjustment was to be in England or in the United
States or in Germany or somewhere else, the fact that it was subsequently
decided by one of the parties that the venue should be England cannot be a
relevant factor in the ascertainment of the proper law at an earlier date. As a
matter of legal logic, I find insuperable difficulty in seeing by what system of
3. 11980] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 450.
4. See International Maritime Committee. Bulletin No. 104 ("Amsterdam Conference
1949") (1951); for the text of the rules, see also 2 R. COtINVAUX. CARRIER'S CARRIAGE BY
SiA, app. at 1275 (T. Carver 12th ed. 1971); and R. LOWNDES, THE LAW o1 GENERAL
AVERAGE, at appendix (1964).
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law one is to decide what, if any, is the legal effect of an event which occurs
when a contract is already in existence with no proper law: but, instead, with
a "floating" non-law.
But in my opinion the difficulty goes beyond mere technicality or legal logic.
Under the terms of this Lloyd's average bond contract, things had to be done
by the parties forthwith and disputes under the contract might well, as a matter
of commercial reality, arise forthwith .... It cannot be that the contract has
to be treated as being anarchic: as having no governing law which the court
• . . would apply in deciding the dispute. There must be a governing law from
the outset: not a floating absence of law, continuing to float until the carrier,
unilaterally, makes a decision.
The governing law cannot fall to be decided, retrospectively, by reference to
an event which was an uncertain event in the future at the time when obligations
under the contract had already been undertaken, had fallen to be performed
and had been performed.
III. After Armar
After the Armar decision, English courts were confronted with floating
choice-of-law clauses in several other cases. In the first such case, Black
Clawson Int'l Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg A.G., 5 the court
analyzed a sales contract containing the following clause:
The arbitration . . . shall take place in Zurich and any question as to the
construction or effect of this contract shall be decided according to the laws of
England if the reference to arbitration shall have been made by the Purchasers
and according to the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany if such reference
shall have been made by the Sellers.
Clearly, the above quoted provision did not provide for a legal system
governing the contract from the outset. Consequently, the clause came
within the Armar doctrine. The court suggested, however, an alternative
to striking the choice-of-law clause down as repugnant to Armar. Ac-
cording to the court, it could be assumed that a "provisional proper law,
liable to be changed retrospectively when a claim is made" existed.
Unfortunately, the court did not elaborate on that point, and, in par-
ticular, did not indicate how such "provisional proper law" should be
determined. One might theorize that until the law governing the contract
is determined pursuant to the choice-of-law clause, the contract is gov-
erned by the law most closely related to the contractual relationship. The
significance of the Black Clawson court's pronouncement on that point
is diminished by the fact that its analysis of the Armar problem was only
dictum.
The cases decided after Black Clawson returned to the Armar doctrine
and did not consider the alternative suggested by the Black Clawson court.
5. [1981] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 446.
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Thus, a choice-of-law clause in a bill of lading providing that the proper
law would be, at the option of the carrier, either Iranian law, or German
law, or English law, was struck down in Dubai Electricity Co. v. Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (The "Iran Voidan").6 The Iran Voidan
court strongly reaffirmed the validity of the Armar doctrine:
The proper law is something so fundamental to questions relating to the
formation, validity, interpretation and performance of a contract that it must,
in my judgment, be built into the fabric of the contract from the start and cannot
float in an indeterminate way until finally determined at the option of one party.
In yet another case involving a floating choice-of-law clause, Cantieri
Navali Riuniti SpA v. NV Omne Justitia (The Stolt Marmaro), the insur-
ance contract conferred on the assured an option to decide whether the
insurance policy would be governed by the law of New York. 7 In analyzing
this provision, the court observed that the option to choose the application
of New York law was conferred on one party only. In dictum, the court
expressed the view that such a contractual provision may not be effective
under English law.
Despite the fact that none of the cases decided after Black Clawson
referred to the alternative approach to the floating choice-of-law problem
suggested in that case, it could be argued that this alternative has not
been abandoned or forgotten. The choice-of-law clauses in Armar, The
Iran Voidan and The Stolt Marmaro were similar in that each granted a
power to choose the governing law to one party only. In Black Clawson,
on the other hand, the applicable law could have been determined by
either of the parties. Under the Armar rationale, such a factual distinction
should be of no importance since in all the cases, including Black Clawson,
there was no single legal system governing the legal relationship between
the parties prior to litigation or arbitration. Nevertheless, it remains to
be seen whether in the future English courts would narrow the application
of the Armar doctrine and reach for the Black Clawson alternative.
IV. Saving Clauses
Another important issue raised by Armar and its progeny concerns the
use of so-called "saving clauses" in a choice-of-law provision. An example
of such a clause can be found in the bill of lading involved in Astro
Venturoso Compania Naviera v. Hellenic Shipyards S.A. (The "Marian-
nina").8 After stipulating the application of English arbitration law, the
contract provided:
6. [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 380.
7. [19851 2 Lloyd's Rep. 428.
8. 119831 1 Lloyd's Rep. 12.
VOL. 20, NO. 3
"FLOATING" CHOICE-OF-LAW CLAUSES 1009
[B]ut if for any reason it is ruled by a competent authority that the . . .
arbitration provision is unenforceable then any claim and/or dispute . . . shall
be governed by Greek Law and solely decided by the competent Greek Courts
of Piraeus where the Carrier has his principal place of business and to which
both parties . . . submit themselves, to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of any
[other] competent Court.
The appellants argued that because the law governing the contract would
change at the time the choice of English arbitration law was refused
recognition by a court, the choice-of-law clause in the bill of lading was
of a floating character, and as such invalid under the Armar doctrine.
The court, however, found the Armar decision to be inapplicable,
commenting:
I accept that it is unusual for a clause to provide expressly or by implication
for two proper laws-one to be applied in one event and another to be applied
if that event is negativated, but I cannot see why there cannot be sound com-
mercial sense in a fall-back provision of the kind which this clause seems to
represent.
There are clear differences between the choice-of-law clause in The
Mariannina and the choice-of-law clauses in the cases discussed above.
For example, it is significant that in The Mariannina the law governing
the contract was fixed from the outset and remained certain until the
occurrence of an event unrelated to the actions of the parties. Still, if
such event occurred the law governing the contract would change. How-
ever, since it was the lack of a single legal system governing the contract
prior to litigation that was the keystone in the Armar rationale, The Mar-
iannina cannot be viewed as an important modification of the Armar
doctrine.
The next step in the analysis of the saving clauses in this context deals
with the enforceability of a saving clause in a floating choice-of-law pro-
vision. The argument that such clause is valid and enforceable was ad-
vanced in The Iran Voidan. There, the floating choice-of law clause was
accompanied by the following provision:
In case the law of the country in which a suit is filed does not recognize this
agreement ... on the exclusive application of Iranian, German or English law
respectively, then the Hague rules enacted in that country shall apply or, if no
such enactment is enforced in that country, the terms of said Convention shall
compulsorily apply.
The court decided that it was not necessary for it to pass on the validity
of the above-quoted provision. The judge writing the opinion expressed
his doubts, however, as to the viability of any argument based on it. In
light of the earlier reaffirmations of the Armar doctrine by the The Iran
Voidan court this view is not surprising. The existence of a saving clause
does not cure any of the defects found by the Armar court in floating
choice-of-law clauses. In particular, since its operation begins only after
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the commencement of litigation, a saving clause does not contribute to
the certainty of the law governing the contract at the time prior to litigation.
V. Should the Armar Decision Be
Followed by the U.S. Courts?
In anticipation of the "floating" choice-of-law issue arising in the U.S.
courts, one should analyze the reasons which led the English judges to
the rejection of the "floating" choice-of-law clause. The main concern of
the English judges was that until the moment the action was instituted,
and the forum was selected by the plaintiff, the contract was "anarchic,"
meaning that there was no law governing the contract until this point.
The same situation exists, however, when parties stipulate that the choice
of the governing law will be made at a point of time later than the time
of contracting. For example, parties quite frequently stipulate for gov-
erning law during the course of the proceedings.
The question of whether the parties should be allowed to change ap-
plicable law during the proceedings was discussed in the Swiss case,
Kunzle v. Bayrische Hypotheken und Wechselbank.9 This case involved
an international commercial contract which contained no stipulation of
applicable law. The plaintiff relied on Swiss law while indicating the pos-
sibility that German law might also be applicable. The defendant stated
that it had no objections to the application of Swiss law. The Swiss court
concluded that a subsequent choice of law, i.e., in this case during the
proceedings was possible:
If the choice of law thus results from a specific selecting process, there is no
reason why it could not be made after the event [i.e., the making of the contract],
namely for the first time during the proceedings. The principle of contractual
freedom is applicable to the selecting agreement because of its contractual
nature. From which it follows that the parties are permitted to change its content
in the future by substituting for the legal system originally chosen another system
which is relevant under the circumstances, and this possibly with retrospective
effect, to the extent that the principal contract has not yet ... been performed.
If it is possible for the parties to pass from one selected legal system to
another, it must be permissible also, by means of a subsequent agreement, to
change the system of law which would be applicable in the absence of a
choice .... So much the more since, on the basis of experience [it is a fact
that] the parties do not usually consider the choice-of-law issue. Rather this
issue arises at some later time when difficulties occur in the implementation of
the contract. If at that time the parties agree upon the applicable legal system,
in a situation of private international law, there is no cogent reason to advance
against such a [selecting] process.
9. Swiss Federal Tribunal (TF.), August 31, 1953; R.O. 79 11. 295, J.D. 1954, 1, 528.
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Many countries authorize the parties to select the law applicable to their
relationship after the making of the contract.' 0
Also, it is quite frequent that international contracts do not contain
provisions governing the question of the applicable law. It would not seem
accurate to conclude that all these contracts are "anarchic," and not
governed by any legal system. Should a dispute regarding the interpre-
tation or construction of such contract arise, the parties would, in the
first instance, attempt to resolve it by negotiation. At this stage, they
would not need to rely on any particular legal system. When the dispute
could not be resolved in such a manner, one of the parties would then
resort to litigation. The judge would decide, by using the applicable con-
flict of laws rules, which legal system governed the contract. Such a
decision would in effect, have a retroactive effect and relates back to the
time of contracting. By the same token, when the parties stipulated in
their agreement that the applicable law would be determined at the time
the lawsuit was instituted the determination of the applicable law then
must be deemed to have a retroactive effect as well. Consequently, in
determining whether a contract is "anarchic" or not, there appears to be
no difference between the situation when the parties fail to provide for
the governing law and the situation when the governing law is determined
by the parties (or one of them) at the time the legal action is brought.
There is another reason why the reasoning of the Armar court should
not be followed by U.S. courts in actions involving the typical choice-of-
law provision used in loan agreements with Mexican borrowers: choice-
of-law provisions in such agreements differ substantially from the choice-
of-law clause involved in the Armar case.
In Armar, the carrier was not limited, in any way, in its choice of forum
and, consequently, the applicable law. The choice-of-law provisions in
loan agreements with Mexican borrowers, on the other hand, provide for
the application of one of two specified legal systems only. Moreover, under
such loan agreements, the law of a U.S. jurisdiction constitutes a "resid-
ual" category. In other words, Mexican law would apply in one situation
only, i.e., when the lender decides to sue in Mexico. In all other cases,
the law of a U.S. jurisdiction governs. Thus, no legal vacuum exists here
as it did in the English cases discussed above. Until the forum has been
selected, the loan agreement is governed by the law of the indicated U.S.
jurisdiction. To be sure, the law which governs the agreement still "floats"
since it will change when a Mexican forum is chosen by the lender. The
sea on which it can float is far smaller, however, then the ocean on which
the law governing the Armar's bill of lading was adrift.
10. See, e.g., G. R. DELAUME, APPLICABLE LAW ON SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES-LAW
AND PRACTICE, Booklet 8, at 15 (1983).
SUMMER 1986
1012 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
The Armar decision should also be read in conjunction with the English
Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 11, which authorizes English courts
to assume jurisdiction when a contract is governed by English law. Thus,
the resolution of the question of whether English law governed the con-
tract in Armar also controlled the question of whether an English court
had jurisdiction over the case. On the other hand, should an action on a
loan agreement with a Mexican borrower be instituted in a U.S. court,
the jurisdiction of that court would not depend upon the validity of the
choice-of-law clause.
Finally, it should be noted that the English court in Armar did not have
an independent basis for the application of English law. Having refused
to give effect to the choice-of-law clause, the court concluded that:
Nothing else, in the facts and circumstances of the present case appears to be
sufficient [to make English law the governing law of the contract], or to make
the English system of law the system with which this transaction has the closest
and most real connection.'1
In an action on a loan agreement with a Mexican borrower, a U.S.
court would face a completely different situation. If the U.S. law chosen
by the parties was that of a jurisdiction which was the domicile of the
lender, where the payment was to be made, or where the negotiations
between the parties took place, such jurisdiction would have enough con-
tacts with that transaction to justify the application of its law even if the
court were to refuse to enforce the choice-of-law provision in the
agreement. 12
VI. International Contracts in U.S. Courts
Some support for the expectation that a U.S. court would not refuse
to enforce the choice-of-law provision of the type typically used in loan
agreements with Mexican borrowers can be found in the language of the
U.S. Supreme Court in two leading cases in the field of international
contracts, Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 13 and Scherk v. Alberto Culver
Co.14
The Bremen case dealt with the issue of whether the forum selection
clause providing for the adjudication in London of any dispute between
a U.S. party and a foreign party could be enforced by a U.S. court.
Although the case did not involve a choice-of-law issue, the opinion con-
11. Supra note 3, at 505.
12. Cf. Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 521 (2d
Cir. 1985).
13. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
14. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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tains some general language indicating the attitude of the U.S. Supreme
Court toward international contracts:
For at least two decades we have witnessed an expansion of overseas com-
mercial activities for business enterprises based in the United States. The barrier
of distance that once tended to confine a business concern to a modest territory
no longer does so. Here we see an American company with special expertise
contracting with a foreign company .... The expansion of American business
and industry will hardly be encouraged if, notwithstanding solemn contracts,
we insist on the parochial concept that all disputes must be resolved under our
laws and our courts. 15
This language was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court two
years later in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.16
Both Bremen and Scherk indicate the Supreme Court's willingness to
take into consideration the interests of the United States business com-
munity while passing on issues relating to international contracts. The
quoted language tends to suggest that the Supreme Court would be willing
to enforce the reasonable measures that encourage and propagate trade
and commerce between U.S. and foreign companies. The choice-of-law
clause used in foreign loan agreements with Mexican borrowers aims at
maximizing the possibility of U.S. lenders having their loan agreements
enforced. The last decision in the AlliedBank case17 by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals indicates that at least some U.S. courts are willing to
take this consideration into account when passing on issues related to
contracts with foreign debtors.
15. Supra note 13 at 8-9.
16. Supra note 14, at 519. The principles of Bremen were most recently reaffirmed by
the Supreme Court in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 87 L. Ed. 2d
244 (516).
17. Supra note 12.
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